and lying—and grows angry with those who do such things, whereas the other makes no distinction between an ignorant, lying, unjust person and a learned, truthful, just person: he hates neither the one nor the other and is angry with neither. The first would be more perfect.

Likewise, suppose there are two beings: one can act with his two hands and turn toward something with his face, whereas the other cannot—either because it is impossible for him to have a face and two hands, or because it is impossible for him to act and turn toward something with the two hands and face. The first would be more perfect.

The face and two hands are not regarded as attributes of deficiency in anything described as possessing them. The face of each thing is according to that to which it is ascribed, and that thing is praised for it, not censured—as in the expressions “the face of the day,” “the face of a garment,” “the face of a people,” “the face of horses,” “the face of an opinion,” and so forth. In no instance of usage is the face ascribed to something identical to the thing to which it is ascribed, whether the usage is literal or figurative.

If it is said, “One who can act through his speech or power without his two hands is more perfect than one who acts with his two hands,” the reply is: One who can act through his power or speech whenever he wills, and with his two hands whenever he wills, is more perfect than one who can act only through his power or speech and cannot act by hand. This is why the human being is more perfect than inanimate objects that act through powers inherent in them, such as fire and water.

Thus, suppose there are two beings: one can act only through a power inherent in him, while the other can act through a power inherent in him and through his speech. The latter is more perfect.

If yet another is posited who can act through a power inherent in him, through his speech, and with his two hands whenever he wills, he is more perfect—more perfect still.