“Do you mean by ‘body’ a composite that was once separate and then came together; something assembled by an assembler who brought its parts together; or something capable of being separated and divided into parts, with one part detached from another, and the like? Or do you mean something composed of indivisible atoms, or of matter and form? Or do you mean something that can be pointed to, that is self-subsisting, or that exists?

“If you mean the former set of meanings, we do not concede that these attributes, which you have called accidents, can subsist only in a body so defined. If you mean the latter set, we do not concede that such concomitance is impossible, for the Lord Most High exists, is self-subsisting, and, in our view, can be pointed to. Thus, on this interpretation, we do not concede the absence of that concomitance.

“As for the assertion:

‘Every composite is contingent,’

if by ‘composite’ the speaker means the previously mentioned senses—such as having once been separate and then come together, having been assembled by an assembler, or being susceptible to separation—we do not concede the first, implicative premise. But if he means something that can be pointed to, or something self-subsisting and described by attributes, we do not concede the negation asserted in the second premise. Thus, the argument based on describing the attributes as accidents consists of two premises—one implicative and the other exceptive—couched in equivocal terms. Once the intended meaning is clarified, one or both premises may be rejected and invalidated. Since, under every interpretation, one of the two premises is invalid, the argument itself is invalid.”