Al-Risālah al-Akmalīyah - Ibn Taimiya - (22)

If, after this, it is objected:

“His essence would be deficient and bereft of perfection only because of these attributes,”

The reply is:

Perfection without these attributes is impossible, and the absence of what is impossible is not a deficiency. Deficiency is only the absence of what is possible.

Furthermore, once it has been established that He can be characterized by perfection, that whatever He is characterized by is necessary for Him, and that it is impossible for His essence to be divested of these attributes, then supposing His essence to be detached from these attributes is an impossible supposition. If an impossible state is posited for the essence and it is said that the essence would be deficient without these attributes, this demonstrates the impossibility of that supposition—not the impossibility of its opposite.

It is just as if it were said:

“Were He to die, He would be deficient.”

This entails that He must be living. Likewise, if supposing His essence to be devoid of these attributes entails that it would be deficient, this necessarily entails that He is characterized by these attributes.

Furthermore, the assertion that “He attains perfection through something other than Himself” is inadmissible. We do not say without qualification of His attributes that they are other than Him, nor that they are not other than Him. This is the position of the leading imams of the Salaf, such as Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal and others, and it is also the position chosen by the most discerning of those who affirm the attributes, such as Ibn Kullāb and others.

Some of them say:

“I do not say without qualification that they are not identical with Him, nor do I say without qualification that they are not other than Him. Neither do I combine the two negations by saying: ‘They are neither identical with Him nor other than Him.’”

This is the position chosen by a group of those who affirm the attributes, such as al-Asharī. I believe that the position of Abū al-Hasan al-Tamīmī is this, or something similar to it.

Others permit both negations to be stated together, such as the judge Abū Bakr and the judge Abū Yalā.

فإن قيل بعد ذلك: لا تكون ذاته ناقصة مسلوبة الكمال إلا بهذه الصفات، قيل: الكمال بدون هذه الصفات ممتنع، وعدم الممتنع ليس نقصًا، وإنما النقص عدم ما يمكن. وأيضًا، فإذا ثبت أنه يمكن اتصافه بالكمال، وما اتصف به وجب له، وامتنع تجرد ذاته عن هذه الصفات، فكان تقدير ذاته منفكة عن هذه الصفات تقديرًا ممتنعًا. وإذا قدر للذات تقدير ممتنع، وقيل: إنها ناقصة بدونه، كان ذلك مما يدل على امتناع ذلك التقدير، لا على امتناع نقيضه، كما لو قيل: إذا مات كان ناقصًا، فهذا يقتضي وجوب كونه حيًا، كذلك إذا كان تقدير ذاته خالية عن هذه الصفات يوجب أن تكون ناقصة، كان ذلك مما يستلزم أن يوصف بهذه الصفات. وأيضًا، فقول القائل: اكتمل بغيره ممنوع، فإنا لا نطلق على صفاته أنها غيره، ولا أنها ليست غيره، على ما عليه أئمة السلف؛ كالإمام أحمد بن حنبل وغيره، وهو اختيار حُذَّاق المثبتة، كابن كُلاَّب وغيره. ومنهم من يقول: أنا لا أطلق عليها أنها ليست هي هو، ولا أطلق عليها أنها ليست غيره، ولا أجمع بين السلبين قأقول: لا هي هو ولا هي غيره، وهو اختيار طائفة من المثبتة كالأشعري، وأظن أن قول أبي الحسن التميمى هو هذا، أو ما يشبه هذا. ومنهم من يجوز إطلاق هذا السلب وهذا السلب في إطلاقهما جميعًا، كالقاضي أبي بكر، والقاضي أبي يعلى.