as something general within concrete things, for universals—precisely insofar as they are universals—exist only in the mind, and knowing an individual does not necessitate knowing the universal as a universal. Consequently, what one grasps through a particular is not the very thing the definition is meant to capture.

This is clarified by observing that to conceive a given object or a given act of knowing is to conceive a particular, whereas a definition is required to convey a universal meaning that is both comprehensive and exclusive. Should someone contend, “The presence of the particular entails the presence of the universal,” or maintain, “The unqualified (al-muṭlaq) is a component of the particular,” we answer as follows.

If the claim is merely that a determinate element comes to be—for whatever is unrestricted in the mind becomes determinate once it exists outside the mind—then that is true, yet it offers them no support. But if the intent is to say that the absolute, whose conception does not preclude shared predication, is itself a constituent of this particular while still remaining universal, this is plainly obstinate; the very notion refutes itself. A particular pertains to one specific instance, whereas the universal is broader and more extensive—how can the greater be a part of the lesser?

Moreover, because what a definition seeks is the universal essence that is simultaneously comprehensive and exclusive, perfectly matching every instance of the definiendum—omitting nothing that belongs to it and admitting nothing foreign—it is obvious that conceiving a particular does not yield such correspondence.

The same rebuttal applies to all other things that can be defined, such as “human being” and the like, whose individual instances anyone is able to conceive.

They also say, “Nothing other than knowledge can be known except through knowledge; therefore, were knowledge to be known through something else, circularity would ensue.”