until the essential attributes are themselves known; and one cannot distinguish those essentials from anything non-essential until he first knows the very essence. Thus, knowledge of the essence is made contingent upon knowledge of the essence—a clear vicious circle.
By the same token, knowing the essential attributes depends on knowing those same attributes. One cannot ascertain which qualities are truly essential to a subject until he realizes that conceiving the essence hinges on conceiving them; yet he does not realize that the conception of the essence hinges on them until he already knows the essence, and he cannot know the essence until he knows the essential attributes. This becomes obvious when one considers their own premise: they maintain that nothing can receive a real definition except by citing its essential attributes. Therefore a preliminary distinction must be made between essential and accidental qualities, and the criterion they give is that an essential quality is one without which the reality itself cannot be conceived. If, however, the reality has not yet been grasped, the attributes on which knowledge of that reality depends cannot be known; and if those attributes are unknown, the essential cannot be separated from the accidental—which is exactly what had to be proved.
This differs from the distinction between necessary and incidental attributes, for that distinction is genuine and objectively grounded.
Investigations into the definition of knowledge and of report:
A representative example is their dispute over the definitions of knowledge, command, report, and the like—topics that are widely discussed in the well-known sciences. Some speculative theologians define knowledge by saying, “It is perceiving the object of knowledge as it truly is.” Others, following the Muʿtazilites who deny that God possesses knowledge, say, “It is the belief of the known.” Still others assert, “Knowledge is that which, in the one who possesses it, necessitates that he be deemed a knower,” and similar statements.
As for the definition of a report, they say, “It is that which can be either true or false,” or, “It is an utterance with respect to which the language customarily allows one to say to its speaker, ‘You have spoken the truth’ or ‘You have lied,’” and the like. These definitions are then met with the well-known objections.