—namely, the broader essential description.

Entailment and implicative indication are exemplified by the relation of the word “roof” to “wall,” for the roof necessarily presupposes the wall as an inseparable companion outside its own essence; similarly, the word “human being” points to “one capable of practising and teaching the craft of tailoring.”

He says: “In definitions what is taken into account are indication by exact correspondence (dalālat al-muṭābaqa) and connotative indication (dalālat al-taḍammun). As for indicative entailment (dalālat al-iltizām), it is not admissible, because what it indicates is neither delimited nor confined. The concomitants of things—and the concomitants of those concomitants—cannot be systematically determined or enumerated; this would result in a single word bearing an infinite number of meanings, and that is impossible.”

Thus he classifies the indication of the specific for the generic—such as the indication of the word “human being” for “animal”—as a connotative indication and regards it as valid in definitions. Yet it is evident that the word “animal” in turn indicates “sentient, voluntarily mobile being,” that “sentient” indicates “growing,” and that “growing” indicates “body.” It is likewise evident that the word “rational” indicates “animal” just as “growing” indicates “body.” Hence one must either be content with the term “rational” alone, or refuse to be content with it unless it is accompanied by the term “animal.” If they accept connotative indication, omission follows inevitably; if they do not, further elaboration becomes unavoidable.

Eighth objection:
Requiring the mention of differentiae while distinguishing between essential and necessary attributes is impossible.

That is, their stipulation that one must include the differentiae—which they consider the distinguishing essential qualities—while at the same time separating the essential from the inseparable accidental attributes of the quiddity is untenable; for there is no differentiating feature, counted among the properties of the thing defined and matching it in both extension and intension, but that a person can