And in replying to a question of this sort, it is not always necessary to cite a common attribute together with the exclusive ones; sometimes the required answer can be attained only by mentioning every shared attribute, sometimes by mentioning only a few of the distinctive ones, and sometimes by other means altogether, depending on the inquirer’s aim and purpose.

Fifth Consideration: Simple conceptions cannot be the object of inquiry

Simple notions, in and of themselves, cannot be sought, and therefore cannot be sought by way of formal definition. The mind is either already aware of such a notion or it is not. If it is aware of it, asking for that very awareness is impossible, for one cannot acquire what one already possesses; the most one may seek is for that awareness to persist, recur, or become more vivid. If, on the other hand, the mind is unaware of it, the soul cannot desire what it does not feel, for every act of seeking and intending is preceded by awareness.

Someone might object: “A person tries to form a conception of an angel, a jinn, the spirit, and many other things without having any immediate awareness of them.” We reply: He has heard these names and seeks to understand what they denote, just as a listener who hears unfamiliar words seeks to grasp their meanings, whether those meanings were previously present to his mind or not. Once he conceives of what these names signify, he must also know that the thing so conceived is designated by that very name; if he pictured a reality to himself without linking the name to it, he would not have conceived what he was after. Here, therefore, what is conceived is the entity along with the knowledge that it is called such-and-such—like a person who had never encountered snow, then sees it and learns that its name is “snow.” This is not merely a conception of the meaning but of the meaning together with its designation, and there is no doubt that such knowledge may legitimately be sought. Yet this does not mean that the bare, simple meaning itself is the object of inquiry; what is sought here is assent, and that involves a linguistic factor.

Moreover, what is sought in such a case cannot be obtained by definition alone: the thing defined must also be indicated—by pointing to it or by some other means—so that mere words do not suffice.