or the animal to which he was unaccustomed, or when he witnesses acts of worship or deeds he had never known. Only then does he form an idea of them and of their names, just as the native speakers do. Such people fall into two groups: some learn by mere observation without ever tasting the reality itself, while others actually taste it.

The second method is to have the matter described to him, and a description may take the place of direct sight, as the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) said:

“Let no woman describe another woman to her husband until it is as though he were looking at her.”

For this reason the majority of jurists allow the sale of absent goods on the basis of description alone. In that case the object described is a particular item, whereas describing an entire class is even easier.

Thus definition by description is what scholars call definition by ḥadd: one must mention those attributes that distinguish the object—or the term—from everything else, such that they encompass all of its individuals and components while excluding whatever is not of it. In reality, this is a definition by analogy and exemplification, for a thing can be conceived only through itself or through something that resembles it.

To clarify: the definer cites attributes that are shared with other things yet still mark out its species. Each attribute merely points to the common element between it and others of its kind. That shared element gives knowledge of the object by way of an exemplar; it does not yield knowledge of the object in its specific individuality. What points to what is common does not point to what is distinctive. Nevertheless, the sum of the attributes sets it apart representatively, not by precise designation, for no other species combines all those attributes, and the thing itself is distinguished only by what is unique to it.