In answering such a question, the state of the inquirer falls into two categories:

First: he may already grasp the meaning through another word, yet does not know that this particular term carries that meaning. Such a person needs nothing more than a translation of the word—just as with the common notions people have of tangible objects, qualities, and actions such as bread and water, eating and drinking, whiteness and blackness, tallness and shortness, motion and stillness, and the like.

Second—the clarification required for one who has no conception of the meaning and is unaware of the term—is that he neither envisions the reality nor knows that the word denotes it. He therefore needs two things: a rendering of the word and an explanation that enables him to picture the meaning, so that both the name and the named object become clear.

This resembles the situation of someone who asks about the word “snow” when he has never seen it, or who inquires about the name of a type of fruit or animal he has never encountered in his land; or someone who asks about the words “mosque,” “prayer,” or “pilgrimage” while still new to Islam and unable to envision their realities; or one who asks about a food or drink he does not know, or about a style of clothing or housing unfamiliar to him.

In short, whenever a person hears the name of some entity, act, or form—whether in the discourse of the Lawgiver, of scholars, or of ordinary people—yet has neither conceived the meaning nor possesses a word for it in his own language, he cannot be made to understand it through mere translation. The correct route is either identification or description.

Identification is accomplished by bringing the named thing before him so that he may see it—if it is something visible—or taste or touch it, and so forth, until he recognizes the referent just as those who use the word do.

Accordingly, when he sees and tastes snow, or sees and tastes the fruit, the cooked dish, or the confection, or sees