…of detail; for were the celestial soul to possess detailed knowledge of them, an infinite multitude would have to exist within it at one and the same moment. Past events are without end, and if awareness of each one of them were present in the celestial soul distinctly and in full detail, an infinity of entities would coexist simultaneously—something impossible.
Should it be said, “They allow this just as they allow for the simultaneous existence of an infinite number of souls. Their principle is that whatever is composite and arranged according to a natural order, like the celestial sphere, or according to a positional order, like physical bodies, cannot be infinite; but once either condition is lifted they admit an infinity—either because the items are not simultaneously composite, as with successive events, or because they are composite yet lack order, as they claim for the celestial souls,” we reply in several ways.
First, this is the opinion of only some of them—such as Ibn Sina and the like. Other philosophers, including Ibn Rushd, have censured him for it, insisting that it is not the doctrine of their leading masters. They have quarrelled among themselves over the matter, but this is not the place to pursue it.
Second, the motions of the spheres are sequential, each depending on the one before it. If we assume that detailed knowledge of these motions is amassed, then sequential events are being held together all at once, and the cognitions that correspond to them are likewise amassed in the celestial soul. Yet, according to their own teaching, particulars can be imprinted only upon bodily faculties; this would therefore necessitate an infinite number of accidents residing in a bodily form—precisely what they most emphatically reject, for a bodily faculty, in their view, cannot carry out an infinite number of acts, let alone bear an infinity of accidents.
Third, suppose they say that the celestial soul has eternally known, in detail, everything that will ever occur. Its knowledge would then be eternal, whereas the motions themselves arise only step by step. Particular events require concomitant, particular conceptions that come into being with them, and they concede as much. If, on the other hand, they claim that the soul learns them only gradually, as events unfold, our point still stands. On either view, the celestial soul, by their own reasoning, must experience successive cognitions just as the human soul does.
If those cognitions remain, ordered events will continue to occur one after another while all of them are gathered in a single locus—indeed, within a corporeal faculty—so that an infinite array of accidents would coexist in one and the same place, and in a bodily power at that. Within their own system, nothing is more manifestly absurd.