To say that a thing is “that about which a statement may be made” is, in effect, to say that a thing is the thing about which a statement may be made, for the meanings of “what,” “that which,” and “thing” are one and the same. In so doing, you have simply re-introduced the word “thing” into the very definition of “thing.” We do not deny that such a formulation—and others like it—may, despite the unsoundness of its method, give some faint indication of the intended concept.

We maintain that the notions of “existent” and “thing” are conceived in the mind; they are two distinct concepts, and the terms “existent,” “affirmed,” and “actualized” are synonymous names for a single meaning. There is no doubt that this meaning is already present in the mind of anyone reading this book.

Likewise, when he addressed the definitions of unity and multiplicity, he said:

“Section: On establishing the realities of the One and the Many, and on demonstrating that number is an accident. What proves difficult for us is to determine the quiddity of the One. When we say that the One is that which is indivisible, we have in fact said that the One is that which is necessarily not multiple; thus, in clarifying the One we have appealed to multiplicity. As for multiplicity, it must inevitably be defined by reference to the One, for the One is the principle of multiplicity, from which its existence and its essence are derived.

“Whatever definition we give for multiplicity must, of necessity, employ the One. For example, when we say that multiplicity is an aggregate of units, we have introduced the unit into the definition of multiplicity; and we have added yet another element, namely, the notion of ‘aggregate,’ which is almost identical with multiplicity itself. When we say ‘of units,’ ‘of ones,’ or ‘of single entities,’ we have introduced in place…"