Such cases are numerous.

The Ninth Path:
He says,

"When the very essence of the cause and that of the effect—that is, the lâzim (the entailed concomitant) and the malzûm (that which entails)—are conceived without any intermediary, assent to the attribution of one to the other must necessarily follow."

We reply: This is nothing but the opening assertion itself. If by “complete conception” he means a conception that already includes apprehension of the malzûm, the statement is true, yet it does not help him, for he had claimed that the bare, unrestricted grasp of the quiddity suffices for that. Moreover, we would oblige him to accept the same consequence in every case: whenever any malzûm is conceived, its lâzim would also have to be conceived—an idea that is false. Likewise, we ourselves accept the point only under the condition of complete conception: we say that, for every lâzim, whenever the malzûm is conceived in a manner so complete that it yields apprehension of the lâzim, knowledge arises that this is its necessary concomitant. If such complete conception is absent, no knowledge of the lâzim is required in any matter, as will be explained later.

He further states,

"Whenever we conceive the reality of the cause and the reality of the effect, it is then impossible not to affirm the attribution of one of them to the other."

If he intends complete conception, this applies to all necessary concomitants; but if he intends something less, the judgment is denied. His claim was that the mere apprehension of the quiddity makes it necessary, whereas we have shown that apprehension is either complete or incomplete, and what he says holds only in the complete case.

The Tenth Path:
One may say: If by manifest necessity (al-luzûm al-bayyin) you mean precisely this, then the same must be said of the necessity of a necessity. Accordingly, when the first lâzim is conceived and the lâzim of that lâzim is conceived, it is then impossible not to know that one of them is the cause of the other; thus the very consequence you were trying to avoid follows—namely, that whenever a thing is conceived, all of its necessary concomitants are likewise conceived.

The Eleventh Path:
He says,

"Once it is established that conceiving the cause necessitates assent to the existence of the proximate effect only when the effect itself is conceived, and since it is possible that the effect is not conceived when the cause is conceived, it therefore does not follow from knowledge of the reality of the cause that one knows every proximate and remote concomitant."

We say to him: You have drawn a distinction…