Now consider Ibn Sīnā, the most eminent of the later philosophers. In his discussions on theology he borrowed far more principles from the theologians than from his own philosophical predecessors, yet most of what he says rests upon disguised sophistic premises that are neither rhetorical, dialectical, nor demonstrative. The same applies to his treatment of the philosophers’ doctrine of divine unity, his remarks on the “secrets of the verses,” and his argument for the eternity of the world—topics I have examined at length elsewhere.

Ninth Point
A refutation of Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī regarding their statements on the “well-known propositions,” which comprise eight categories.

Ninth Point (continued)
They have excluded the propositions they call “estimative” (wahmiyyāt) and those they term “praiseworthy opinions” from the rank of certainties. Yet we have shown elsewhere that these and the other rational propositions are on the same footing; no distinction may be drawn between them, for innate human nature affirms both in exactly the same way.

Concerning the well-known propositions, Ibn Sīnā says in his Ishārāt:

“The kinds of propositions employed among those who use analogical reasoning, and among those of like method, are four: (1) the accepted (musallamāt); (2) the probable (maznūnāt) and what resembles them; (3) those that merely mimic genuine propositions; and (4) the imagined (mutakhayyalāt). The accepted are either convictions or adopted premises. Convictions are of three kinds: those whose acceptance is obligatory, the well-known, and the estimative. Those whose acceptance is obligatory include the primary intuitions, the perceptual certainties, the experiential, and with them the intuitive, the widely transmitted, and the propositions whose syllogisms accompany them.”

He then says:

“As for the well-known among this group, they likewise include these first principles and the like; they are accepted not because they must be accepted in themselves, but because they enjoy universal acknowledgment.”