This, then, concerns matters that the Law has declared permissible.

In such cases one of two statements must necessarily be affirmed. Either we say: A believer of sound faith does not dislike it, for a believer does not dislike what Allah and His Messenger have commanded—and this is something Allah and His Messenger have commanded. Or we say: if he does dislike it, then in that respect his faith is deficient; within him is a branch of hypocrisy, so he is not the “brother” referred to in the words, “You have mentioned your brother with what he detests.” This is based on the principle that a single person may embody both obedience and disobedience, piety and sinfulness, good and evil, a branch of faith and a branch of hypocrisy.

Alternatively, if it is conceded that the wording does apply to him, this would fall under the heading of permissible backbiting. One must therefore choose between two conclusions: either it is not covered by the very definition of backbiting, or it is not covered by the part of backbiting that is forbidden. Similar instances may be cited.

The purpose of mentioning the example is to highlight that anyone who claims to have formulated a definition of a term must furnish evidence, and the same holds for one who claims to have provided a definition “in reality.”

This position, adopted by the Muslim dialecticians and others, is in several respects sounder than that of the Greek logicians. The latter assert that a definition furnishes a mental image of the essence in the hearer’s mind and that this comes about merely by the definer’s statement, without any proof whatsoever.

They then turned to the inseparable attributes of a subject and divided them into three classes: (1) essential attributes that are incorporated into the essence itself; (2) attributes that lie outside the essence yet are necessary to the essence, though not to the entity’s existence; and (3) attributes that lie outside the essence yet are necessary to its existence. All of this is false if by “essence” (mahiyyah) one means the external realities that definitions and descriptions seek to grasp. If, however, one assumes that the essence is nothing more than what the mind conceives, then the scope of that essence and its attribute follows the thinker’s conception. At one time he may picture “a sentient, growing body that moves by volition and speaks,” so the essence consists of all those components. Another time he envisions “a rational animal,” another “a laughing animal,” another merely “laughing,” and another merely “speaking.” Thus, whatever enters his conception he counts as part of the essence, and