nor its impossibility, nor anything whatsoever concerning it, then what he has in mind is mere fancy and idle whispering; it has nothing to do with knowledge. If, on the other hand, he does conceive its non-existence in the external world, he has formed a conception qualified by non-existence; his conception, therefore, is not free of all restraints.
If you ask, “What, then, is the sort of conception that can become the object of assent?” the answer is: it is a conception that is devoid of knowing that specific assent, not one stripped of every positive and negative qualification. Thus, when someone is unsure whether nabīdh is unlawful or not, he has already conceived of nabīdh and conceived of unlawfulness, and each conception is accompanied by its own qualifications. He knows that nabīdh is a beverage, that it exists, that it is drunk, that it intoxicates, and so on, yet he does not know that it is unlawful. Hence, the conception that is prerequisite for assent need not be utterly free of all affirmative and negative attributes; it need only be free of being tied to that particular assent.
The statement, “Assent is preceded by conception,” is like saying, “Speech is preceded by knowledge.” Just as no one may speak about what he does not know, likewise he can neither affirm nor deny what he does not conceive. A complete conception, therefore, entails assent, whereas an incomplete conception requires additional evidence to establish its ruling.
This confirms the position maintained by the Muslim dialecticians, as we have already explained: individual conceptions are not learned merely by means of a definition; what is truly sought through a definition is an assent that needs the same kind of proof required for other assents. We noted earlier that what the logicians call a “definition” is itself an assent that demands evidence. Likewise here, what they style a “syllogism” in fact reverts to definition and conception, just as that syllogism serves to teach the very meaning of “wine.” If, then, they claim that a definition neither can nor need be supported by proof, we reply: knowing what the word “wine” denotes does not require a syllogism. It can be known in the very way all other simple conceptions and the referents of all names are known—through the soul’s intuitive recognition that such-and-such a meaning applies to such-and-such a instance and is truly present therein.
The more carefully an intelligent person reflects on this and truly understands it, the clearer it becomes to him that the correct view is the one held by the Muslim dialecticians.