The establishment of certain knowledge concerning the Maker and the reality of prophethood is not dependent on any sort of syllogism. Rather, it is attained through the signs that point to a unique, incomparable Being, and through self-evident knowledge that requires no deliberation. Whatever portion of that knowledge happens to be expressed by a universal (shumūlī) syllogism is no different from knowledge expressed by analogical qiyās: it remains a general idea that, by itself, gives no insight into what is peculiar to the Lord or what is peculiar to the Messenger, unless some other knowledge is joined to it.
The truthfulness of a specific informant—even if he is not a prophet—is established by many causes other than syllogism; it may also be known through analogical reasoning just as it may through a universal syllogism. If that is the case for an ordinary person, then the certainty of the Truthful Prophet—may God bless him and grant him peace—is all the more evident. Elsewhere we have set out a number of the methods by which the prophets’ veracity is known.
People learn about existing things, their qualities, and their states without resorting to any universal syllogism, let alone to the claim that two premises—a minor and a major—are indispensable, the minor containing the minor term, the major the major term, with the middle term repeated as predicate in the minor and subject in the major, as in the statement, “Every wine is forbidden.” Once one knows that every wine is forbidden, he may at first recognize the individual instances of wine and that the word embraces every intoxicant; or he may imagine it includes only some intoxicants, such as strongly fermented grape juice, and only later learn that it covers every intoxicant. When this new knowledge dawns, what is really renewed is his awareness of the universal rule, and that universal awareness is simply the fruit of his complete conception of the term “wine.” Previously his conception was partial; had it been comprehensive from the outset, he would not have needed a syllogism. It is therefore clear that the syllogism which yields assent is dispensed with once one has a complete conception of the middle term.
Every conception can be cast as an assent, and vice versa: ultimately, whatever they label “conception” can be formulated as “assent,” and whatever they label “assent” can be recast as “conception.” For when someone asks, “What is wine …"