one ḥadd is sufficient, and from those two premises the required conclusion follows: every intoxicant is unlawful.
Contemplation (naẓar) is of two kinds:
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The first is to contemplate the very question whose ruling is sought, searching for the proof—that is, for the middle term. This kind of contemplation does not coexist with knowledge; rather, it stands in opposition to it, for the person engaging in it is still seeking knowledge. Had he already known the ruling, he would not be looking for it; that would be to obtain what is already in hand.
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The second kind is to contemplate the proof itself—that is, to possess knowledge of the evidence whose very nature entails knowledge of what it indicates. It consists in grasping the middle term, which obliges that the major predicate be affirmed of the minor. Thus, whoever knows that wine is forbidden and that every intoxicant is wine must necessarily know that every intoxicant is forbidden. This form of contemplation is the mental arrangement of the two premises; it is the sort that produces knowledge and does not conflict with it.
People are greatly confused over this issue: does contemplation yield knowledge or not, and is it inimical to knowledge or not? Many dialecticians write that contemplation contradicts knowledge and yet is also indispensable for knowledge—an obvious contradiction, for that which necessarily produces something cannot at the same time oppose it. The contemplation that yields knowledge is different from the contemplation that conflicts with it. The former is inferential contemplation; the latter is investigative contemplation. Inferential contemplation is directed at the evidence itself: once one grasps it and understands how it entails the ruling, the ruling becomes clear. Investigative contemplation, by contrast, looks at the question whose ruling is sought, wondering whether or not a proof can be found—like someone searching for a lost possession. He may find what he seeks, he may not, or he may even abandon both search and object. The first process moves from principles to conclusions, whereas the second moves from conclusions back to principles.
In fact, contemplation is analogous to physical sight, which also comes in two forms:
• The first is staring intently in order to see; this corresponds to the heart’s focusing on a matter in order to discover its ruling. Knowledge may result from this focus, or it may not. While the seeker is still searching, he does not yet possess knowledge of the object sought—whether that knowledge be one of assent or, according to those who distinguish conception from assent, one of mere conception.
• The second is the act of seeing itself; this corresponds to perceiving the evidence, such as arranging the two premises and uncovering the middle term.