Muḥammad b. Yūsuf al-ʿĀmirī, one of those who wrote on the philosophers’ doctrines, relates that the earliest of them travelled to Syria and studied under the followers of the prophets David and Solomon; that Pythagoras, the teacher of Socrates, studied under Luqmān the Wise; and that Socrates taught Plato, who in turn taught Aristotle.
The point to be made here is that Muslim dialecticians have never ceased composing refutations of the philosophers—both in logic and in other fields—exposing their mistakes in definition and syllogism just as they expose their errors in theology and beyond. None of the Muslim scholars of kalām ever paid heed to the philosophers’ method; indeed, the Muʿtazilites, Ashʿarites, Karrāmites, Shiʿites, and every other school of speculative theology all condemned it and demonstrated its unsoundness. The first to blend their logic with the principles of the Muslims was Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, and the scholars of Islam have discussed his stance at great length—too long to record here.
Al-Nawbakhtī’s critique of logic
This rebuttal is found in many works by theologians, yet I first came across the passage in the writings of al-Nawbakhtī. After outlining Aristotle’s procedure in logic, he said:
“Some Muslim theologians have objected to these logical arrangements and have said: As for the logician’s claim that
‘A syllogism cannot be constructed from a single premise,’
that is mistaken. When someone, for example, wishes to prove that man is a substance, he may argue the very point in question without setting out two premises, simply by saying:
‘The proof that man is a substance is that he accepts opposites at different times.’
He has no need for a second premise such as,
‘Everything that accepts opposites at different times is a substance,’
because demonstrating that
‘Everything that accepts opposites at different times is a substance’
is itself the very matter disputed and in need of proof; the particular is included within the universal, and establishing either one renders the other superfluous. Likewise, when a person beholds an effect he may infer that it has a cause, or, upon seeing writing, that there is…"