They may concede that point. They then assert that two—and only two—premises are indispensable. They add that most people, for brevity’s sake, leave one premise unstated because it is obvious; this they call an “enthymeme.” When a conclusion requires several premises, they treat what is essentially one proof as a series of separate syllogisms, on the ground that every syllogism must contain exactly two premises. They name this a “compound syllogism,” and divide it into (1) a “continuous” form, in which only the final conclusion is stated, and (2) a “disjointed” form, in which a conclusion is given after each pair of premises.
An example of the first is: “This is nabidh; every nabidh is intoxicating; every intoxicant is khamr; every khamr is forbidden; therefore, this is forbidden.”
An example of the second is: “This is nabidh, and every nabidh is intoxicating; therefore, this is intoxicating. Next: every intoxicant is khamr, and every khamr is forbidden; therefore, every intoxicant is forbidden. Finally: this is intoxicating, and every intoxicant is forbidden; therefore, this is forbidden.”
All of this is mistaken. The view held by the great majority of investigators—Muslim and otherwise—is that an argument may rest at times on a single premise, at times on two, at times on three, and at times on even more. Whatever of the premises is already known needs no proof; demonstration is required only for what is unknown. The unknown conclusion is known through its proof, and its proof is whatever entails it. Every ground may legitimately be used to establish its consequent. Accordingly, if the desired proposition is a ground whose entailment is known, one infers it by that entailment and that suffices. If the reasoner knows only the ground of that ground, he needs two premises; if he knows only the ground of that ground of that ground, he needs three; and so on without limit.
Clarification that acquiring knowledge is not contingent upon the logicians’ syllogism:
Hence we say: we do not deny that syllogism yields knowledge when its materials are certain. What we maintain is that the knowledge thus obtained does not depend on the logicians’ formal syllogism; it can be attained without it. No item of knowledge is therefore contingent upon that particular form of argument.