a form of torment that yields no benefit; indeed, he may not even grasp the discussion, and all manner of doubts could beset him.

Evidence is that which leads to the desired conclusion.

In the same way, evidence (dalīl) and demonstration (burhān) function as guides to the objective and conduits to the intended meaning. Anything that entails another matter can serve as proof for that matter. Hence the maxim: “Evidence is what, when examined soundly, brings about certainty or at least probable knowledge.” Some scholastic theologians restrict the word dalīl to what produces certainty, calling what produces only probability an imārah (indicator). This, however, is merely a convention coined by the Muʿtazilah and those who adopted their usage.

The point, then, is that whatever necessitates something else—so that the latter is inseparable from it—constitutes evidence and proof for that thing, whether both are positive existents, both are negations, or one is existent and the other nonexistent. Evidence is always inseparable from what it proves, and what is proved is inseparable from its evidence.

Sometimes the proof consists of a single premise: once that premise is known, the conclusion is known. At other times the arguer may need two premises, or three, four, five, or even more. There is no fixed number that applies equally to everyone in every inquiry; it all depends on the investigator’s familiarity with the issue, the evidence, and the mutual implications involved.

Suppose, therefore, that a person already possesses everything needed to establish the conclusion except for one premise; in that case, the only proof he requires is for that single missing premise. Consider someone who knows that khamr is forbidden and that the contested variety of nabīdh is intoxicating, yet does not know that every intoxicant is deemed khamr. He needs only this one premise. If he is told, “It is authentically reported in Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim that the Prophet (may Allah bless him and grant him peace) said, ‘Every intoxicant is khamr,’” his objective is fulfilled. He has no need to add, “Every nabīdh is intoxicating, and every intoxicant is khamr,” nor to say, “Every intoxicant is khamr, and every khamr is unlawful,” for he already knows these points. The only issue unclear to him was whether the term khamr is confined to certain intoxicants—as some Muslim scholars supposed—or whether it encompasses every intoxicant. Once this is established for him on the authority of the Lawgiver