by the infallible. Indeed, they sometimes relegate an inference in which one of its premises rests on the statement of the infallible to the merely “rhetorical” (khaṭabī) or “dialectical” (jadalī) class, because they treat those propositions as belonging to what is simply granted and accepted, not to the realm of demonstrative certainty.

This, too, is part of their misguidance. A proposition counts as certain only when it is known with incontestable certainty to be true. Once a decisive proof establishes that the infallible speaks nothing but the truth, and it is necessarily known that he has affirmed this very universal proposition—just as he affirmed that “Allah is Knowing of all things,” that “Allah is the Creator of all things,” that “there will be no prophet after him,” and similar universally worded reports whose transmission from the infallible is indisputable—then that constitutes one of the finest avenues to certainty. This path, however, does not fall under their so-called demonstrative syllogism. Because it rests on textual premises which we have not set out in this place, we have not used it against them; instead, we have argued with them on the basis of what they themselves acknowledge.

What we have shown by pure reason is that their claim—that acquired knowledge can be obtained only through their demonstrative syllogism—is false; indeed, it is among the gravest of falsehoods.

This, then, concludes the refutation on the negative side.