The rulings that are established by textual evidence, they say, are tied to confined causes. A transferable cause is invoked only when one revealed text addresses some instances of a ruling; the ruling is then explained by a cause that can extend to the rest of the genus whose applicability is affirmed by another text.

The second benefit is that one gains insight into the judgment of the Sacred Law and the benefits it secures for God’s servants in this life and the next. Such understanding increases faith and knowledge, aids assent and obedience, shuts down the specious arguments of atheists and scoffers, and supports the position that the entire Law was enacted for wisdom and mercy—not, as some claim, solely to impose servitude by bare divine will, devoid of wisdom and mercy.

Moreover, because the attributes found in the original case may be unique to that case or shared with other cases outside it, it does not follow that, merely because a particular original case has its ruling established on account of a shared external attribute, every original case must have its ruling grounded in some shared external attribute.

Reply to their objection:

They say, “Even if the ruling is connected to something external, it may still rest on a reason other than the one that has been expressed, a reason that remains hidden despite investigation—unlike what is perceived by the senses.” We reply: Either exhaustive division in rational matters can yield certainty, or it never can. If the first, their inclusion of the disjunctive hypothetical argument among the recognized forms of syllogism and demonstrative proof collapses; if the second, their present claim collapses—and the latter collapse is the more evident. For when someone says, “Existence is either necessary or contingent, either eternal or originated, either self-subsistent or dependent on another, either created or Creator,” and the like—an exhaustive enumeration of the genus of existence—that is indeed a true and comprehensive division.