Many Hanbalis, Shafiʿis, Malikis, Sufis, and ḥadith scholars hold this view as well.

As for their claim that, being originated, it would require another act of creation, this too is inadmissible. They themselves concede that created entities are originated and yet exist apart from the Originator without the occurrence of an additional creative act. If that is possible for a temporal event external to Him, then—so much the more—a temporal event that is inseparable from Him may occur without a further act of creation.

For this reason many, indeed most, of them maintain that the creative act subsisting in Him is contingent (ḥādith) but not brought into being by another (muḥdath). They say that whatever act subsists in Him occurs solely through His power and will; it does not require another creating act. Only the created thing needs creation, and a “created thing” is whatever exists apart from Him. Accordingly, many of them call the act muḥdath, asserting that it is originated yet not created, for a created entity is that which He brings into existence outside Himself. His very act, speech, pleasure, anger, and joy—each arising in His Essence by His power—are, though temporal and originated, not created. Thus, in their view, not every contingent or originated thing is necessarily created.

If it is said that the disagreement is merely verbal, that does not undermine their position. Should someone insist on calling what subsists in Him “created,” they reply: at most this entails that the created entity which is itself the act of creation needs no further act of creation. It does not follow that a created thing which is not itself an act of creation could dispense with a creator, for reason dictates that every created thing must have a creative act. As for the creative act itself, if one allows a created thing to exist without a prior act of creation, then allowing a creative act to exist without another act of creation is even more plausible. Their opponent permits every created thing to exist without a creative act; if they permit only one type to do so, their view is the more reasonable. The distinction between the creative act by which the created thing is brought into being and the created thing itself is perfectly intelligible.

Inquiry into the subsistence of temporal events in Him, exalted be He:

Similarly, their argument based on the supposed impossibility of temporal events inhering in Him is of no use against the philosophers, for the latter denied such inherence solely because they deemed it impossible for a temporal event to subsist in the Eternal, whereas these very philosophers in fact allow for temporal events to subsist.