Moreover, every definition they advance serves solely to differentiate the thing defined from everything else. Since a definition yields no more than this differentiation—and since that same differentiation can be obtained through the differentia (fasl) or through a proprium (khāṣṣah)—it becomes clear that the theologians’ method is the sounder way to achieve the proper aim of defining.

As for his statement, “That is exceedingly remote from defining the very essence of the thing,” we reply: the very same holds for all the other definitions; none of them provides a mental picture of the thing’s essence, as we shall clarify, God willing. Indeed, the considerations he himself mentions turn into evidence against them.

His claim that one must invariably employ the proximate genus is merely a matter of convention. For when the remote genus is used, the differentia points to the proximate genus by implication or necessary entailment, just as the proximate genus points to the remote. Thus, in their terminology, “rational” indicates “animal,” and “intoxicating” indicates “drink,” just as “animal” indicates “body” and “drink” indicates “liquid,” whether they classify these links as inclusion (tadammun) or entailment (iltizām). If such indication satisfies them, the differentia alone is enough; if they insist on direct signification of essential attributes, then merely naming the proximate genus will not suffice either.

Hence, when one says “an intoxicating liquid,” the word “intoxicating” shows that the thing is a drink, for “intoxicating” is, in their system, more specific than either “drink” or “liquid” and functions as the differentia, just as “rational” does for “human.” Accordingly, every intoxicant is a drink, just as every rational being is an animal. Likewise, when man is defined as “a rational body,” the term “rational” is, in their view, more specific than “body” or “animal”; it points to “animal” by implication or entailment, while the term “liquid” in the earlier example designates the remote genus directly.

Again, when one says “an intoxicating drink,” the word “drink,” in their reckoning, denotes “liquid” by implication or entailment while directly indicating the proximate genus. The difference between the two formulations, then, is that sometimes—