His conclusion, then, is sound; the remaining question is whether the one advancing it argues for it competently or not.

As for the person who says, “He is not composite in either of those two ways; I simply call Him a ‘body’ or a ‘substance,’ because in my usage both words apply to any self-subsisting existent,” our dispute with him over the terms “body” (jism) and “substance” (jawhar) is purely verbal, not rational and not scriptural. The Revealed Law neither affirms nor denies these names, and reason is concerned with meanings, not with bare vocabulary. The discussion with such a person therefore turns on two issues: first, whether a body must be composed in one of the two senses—this is a well-known rational inquiry; and second, whether the word “body” in Arabic applies to everything that is composite—and this entity is composite—an inquiry of language that belongs elsewhere.

But these people do not seek, by denying composition, to negate only that particular meaning. Many of those who affirm the divine attributes agree with them on that point. Their real aim is to say that He is not qualified by any positive attribute at all. They seized upon the term “composition,” whose meaning certain theologians had joined them in rejecting, then broadened it until it covered more than those theologians had intended, repudiated it, and ended up like the outright Jahmites, who deny the divine Names and Attributes altogether or admit them only metaphorically.

The proof advanced by the deniers of the attributes and the reply to it:

Our purpose here is to say: When they assert that One described as living, knowing, and all-powerful is therefore a composite of these attributes, we answer: call this “composition,” “corporealism,” or whatever you like—what proof, rational or revealed, do you have for rejecting it? They reply, “The proof is that every composite depends on its parts; each part is other than the whole. Therefore the composite depends on something other than itself, and whatever depends on another is not necessary in itself.”

We respond: The elements of this argument, and the terms you label “definitions,” are all ambiguous; they can support truth or falsehood. Using equivocal language in definitions and syllogisms is nothing but sophistry.

Thus we say to you: It is now clear that the word “composite” is equivocal, and that what is meant by it here is an Essence in which attributes inhere. Consequently, the “dependence” in question refers only to the inseparability of the Essence and the attributes, meaning that