Now, since the middle term leads to the third, it follows that the first term entails the third; for whatever entails something that itself entails is an entailment, and the consequence of a consequence is likewise a consequence. Thus the ruling is one of the necessary consequences of the proof, yet its necessity is recognized only through an intermediate element between the two—and that intermediate element is what you append by saying, “because….”

This is exactly what the logicians—Avicenna and others—have mentioned when speaking of the attributes that necessarily belong to a subject. They pointed out that some of those attributes are self-evidently consequent, and with that they refuted colleagues who tried to distinguish between an “essential” attribute and one “necessary to the quiddity,” defining the latter as whatever needs a middle term, unlike the former. Their reply was that many necessary attributes require no middle at all, for their necessity is manifest; in their usage the middle term is simply the proof.

Some people imagined that the middle is something that, in reality, sits midway between a proximate and a remote consequence. This is mistaken. Even so, the point is established on either assumption, and we say:

Among consequences there are those whose connection to their antecedent is self-evident and needs no mediating proof; merely conceiving the antecedent together with the consequent suffices to know that it belongs to it. When there is a middle term between them, and the necessity of that middle for the first and of the second for that middle is evident, no second middle is required. If one of the two connections is not self-evident, a middle term is needed; and if neither connection is evident, two middles are needed. In such a case, the middle functions as a definition, and a single premise is enough.

Accordingly, when proof is demanded for the prohibition of an intoxicating nabidh and someone replies, “Because it has been authentically reported that the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—said, ‘Every intoxicant is wine,’ or, ‘Every intoxicant is unlawful,’” this statement of the Prophet is the middle term. For a believer, no further middle is required to see that intoxicants are forbidden, nor is another middle needed to see that the contested intoxicating nabidh is forbidden by virtue of that rule, for everyone knows that if every intoxicant is forbidden, then the disputed intoxicating nabidh is likewise forbidden, and everyone—