Someone might be asked to provide proof for the prohibition of a particular drink after declaring, “This is unlawful.” He answers, “Because it is an intoxicating nabidh.” That single premise is enough—provided the listener already knows, and grants, that every intoxicant is forbidden.
If the listener objects, saying, “I do not concede that this drink intoxicates,” the speaker must establish that point—either by citing the testimony of a trustworthy witness or by experimentation with a similar sample. This is analogical inference (qiyās at-tamthīl), and it yields certainty: when a portion of a large quantity of beverage is tested and found intoxicating, one knows the rest is likewise, for what holds true of a part holds true of the whole. The same principle governs all experimental propositions—such as knowing that bread satiates or that water quenches thirst—and, indeed, all empirical judgments that have become universally acknowledged; they are all grounded in this kind of analogical inference.
Should the inquirer dispute the unlawfulness of intoxicating nabidh, two premises are now required: first, that this drink is intoxicating; second, that every intoxicant is khamr. The second premise is proven by several texts, among them the words of the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him:
“Every intoxicant is khamr,”
“Every beverage that intoxicates is unlawful,”
and his response, when asked about a honey-based drink called bitʿ and a barley drink called mizr—he who was given concise, comprehensive speech—“Every intoxicant is unlawful.”
These authentic ḥadiths, and many others well known from the Prophet, clearly show that every intoxicating drink is forbidden.
If the challenger says, “I acknowledge it is khamr, but I do not accept that khamr is unlawful,” or “I do not accept that it is absolutely unlawful,” then a third premise must be established, and so on.
Further clarification that a single premise may suffice:
What demonstrates that a lone premise can be adequate for attaining the desired conclusion is that a proof, as previously explained, is whatever necessarily entails the judgment in question; and since the first term entails the middle