is equivalent to a complete proposition. Thus, when someone says, “Intoxicating nabīdh is unlawful,” and the respondent answers, “Yes,” that single word “Yes” stands for the full statement, “It is unlawful.”
If he then asks, “What is the proof for that?” and the answer is, “Its proof is the prohibition of every intoxicant,” or, “that every intoxicant is unlawful,” or the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—said, “Every intoxicant is unlawful,” and similar expressions, the evidence in each case is couched in a single noun phrase, a single component, not in a full clause made up of a subject and predicate. The phrase “the prohibition of every intoxicant” is a genitive construction; and the phrase “that every intoxicant is unlawful,” with the fatḥa on ʾanna, is likewise treated as a single verbal noun. By contrast, ʾinna with a kasra and what follows it constitute a complete sentence. For this reason the grammarians unanimously state that ʾinna takes a kasra when it stands for an entire clause—a predicate, a full proposition—but it takes a fatḥa when it occupies the place of a single noun that forms only one part of the proposition. Therefore they use the kasra form after verbs of saying, because what is reported after “he said” is a complete sentence.
The same applies when you say, “Its proof is the statement of the Messenger of Allah (Allah bless him and grant him peace),” or, “Its proof is the revealed text,” or, “the consensus of the Companions,” or, “the proof is such-and-such a verse,” “such-and-such a ḥadīth,” “the presence of an unopposed cause that necessitates prohibition,” or, “the proof is that it shares with grape wine the factor that entails prohibition,” and so forth. In all these cases the proof is expressed by a single noun phrase rather than by a full proposition; yet when that proof is unpacked it is articulated in several statements.
Our point is this: your claim that analogical reasoning, as a proof, can consist of no more than two parts—meaning only two words—and that anything exceeding two words constitutes multiple proofs rather than a single proof because each additional attribute requires its own evidence, could just as readily be turned back upon the two-word expression itself. One could say that even those two words amount to two separate proofs rather than one, for every premise needs its own corroboration.
Accordingly, to restrict the number to precisely two and exclude anything beyond that is an arbitrary stipulation devoid of substance, for the intended meaning may sometimes be conveyed by a single word, sometimes it cannot be conveyed except by two, and at other times it requires three.