An argument may therefore require two separate premises when the hearer does not know that the disputed intoxicating nabīdh is unlawful and does not even know that this particular beverage is intoxicating. He cannot be certain of its prohibition until he learns, first, that it causes intoxication and, second, that every intoxicant is forbidden.

Someone else may realize that the drink intoxicates and that every intoxicant is, in fact, wine, yet remain unaware that the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—prohibited wine. This might be because he is a recent convert, or because he grew up among ignorant people or among heretics who question the ruling.

Another person may have heard the Prophet’s statement, “Every intoxicant is unlawful,” or may know that this drink is indeed wine and that the Prophet—peace be upon him—forbade wine, but still not know that Muḥammad is the Messenger of God. Or he may not realize that the prohibition applies to all believers; instead, he imagines that it was permitted for certain individuals and assumes he is among them—like someone who thinks drinking is allowed for medical treatment or some similar excuse. Such partial knowledge does not suffice to establish the general prohibition of that intoxicating nabīdh. He must also know that it intoxicates, that it is wine, that the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—prohibited wine or prohibited every intoxicant, that he is truly the Messenger of God, that whatever he forbids God has likewise forbidden, and that his prohibition is comprehensive: it is not allowed for cure or for pleasure.

The futility of insisting that every proof must contain exactly two premises is further demonstrated by the very definition of “syllogism” (qiyās) offered by the logicians—a definition that embraces the demonstrative, rhetorical, dialectical, poetical, and sophistical forms alike. They say: “A syllogism is a discourse composed of statements—or an expression signifying such a composition—such that, once the statements are conceded, another statement necessarily follows from them.” They add: “By saying ‘composed of statements’ we excluded the single proposition that, by itself, entails the truth of its converse and the converse of its contradictory and the falsity of its contradictory, for such a proposition is not a syllogism. Nor did we say ‘composed of premises,’ because we cannot define a premise as a premise except by identifying it as a part of the syllogism; to include that in the definition of syllogism would be circular.”

Accordingly, when an informative proposition forms part of the syllogism, they call it a “premise”; when it is derived through the syllogism, they call it a “conclusion”; and when it stands independently of either role, they simply call it a “proposition”—and it is also referred to