into some universal axiom stating that nothing can be both black and white, or both in motion and at rest—and the same applies to every pair whose opposition is already recognized. For once a person knows that the two given particulars are contraries, he knows they cannot coexist; but if he does not yet know they are contraries, his awareness of the universal rule that “no two contraries can coexist” will be of no benefit. Knowledge of that universal rule merely supplies the major premise that contains the major term, and that, by itself, is of no use without the minor premise that contains the minor term. The conclusion—that these two specified items are contraries and therefore cannot coexist—can be reached without first grasping the major premise “Every pair of contraries cannot coexist.” Hence arriving at this knowledge does not require the syllogistic procedure that they have singled out and called “demonstration” (burhān).

Indeed, the word burhān in the speech of God, His Messenger, and the scholars of every discipline is not confined to what they call “demonstration.” They alone have restricted the term to the syllogistic form whose structure and material they themselves have outlined.

Take, for instance, the attempt to refute those who posit the existence of “states” (aḥwāl) and claim that such states are neither existent nor non-existent. One might respond: “Existence and non-existence are contradictories, and any two contradictories can neither both obtain nor both be absent.” Declaring something to be neither existent nor non-existent treats one of the contradictories as absent, yet it is impossible for anything to be neither existent nor non-existent at the same time; consequently, it is impossible for a “state” to be neither existent nor non-existent. Realizing that this particular thing cannot be both existent and non-existent is possible without recourse to the universal axiom, so certainty about the conclusion does not depend on a burhān.

The same holds when one says, “This entity is contingent, and every contingent being must have something that tips the balance toward its existence rather than its non-existence”—according to the sounder opinion—or, according to another group, “must have something that decides between its two possibilities.” Or when one says, “This entity is originated, and every originated thing must have an originator.” Those universal propositions—“Every originated thing has an originator” and “Every contingent thing requires a preponderating cause”—can certainly function as major premises in the sort of demonstrative syllogism they champion. Yet one may know the particular instances he seeks to establish without knowing those universals on which, in their view, the demonstration depends; thus he knows that this originated entity must have an originator, and this