He goes on to affirm in his “New Risālah” that whenever no dissenting view is known, one must not label the matter a consensus. The Prophet’s statements are far too weighty, in the sight of Imam Aḥmad and the rest of the leading ḥadith scholars, to be set aside for a merely conjectured consensus that rests on nothing more than ignorance of any opposing opinion. Were such a procedure admissible, the scriptural texts would be rendered void, and every person who happened not to hear of a contrary view on some ruling could set his lack of knowledge above those texts.

Ibn al-Qayyim likewise says (3/464–465):
“The early pious generations reacted with severe censure and anger toward anyone who opposed a ḥadith of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ on the basis of personal reasoning, analogy, preference, or the statement of any human being, whoever he might be. They would boycott such a person, denounce anyone who set up parallels in his defense, and would tolerate nothing but full submission to the Prophet ﷺ—listening, obeying, and yielding without hesitation. The thought never even crossed their minds to suspend acceptance of a report until they could find supporting practice, an analogy, or confirmation from So-and-so or So-and-so. Rather, they lived by the verse: ‘It is not for a believing man or a believing woman, once Allah and His Messenger have decided a matter, to have any choice in that regard’ (al-Aḥzāb 36), and by similar texts already cited.

“Today, however, we find ourselves in an age where, if someone is told, ‘It has been firmly established that the Prophet ﷺ said such-and-such,’ he retorts, ‘Who said that before?’—shoving the ḥadith aside. He turns his own ignorance of a prior expositor into a pretext for contradicting the report and abandoning its application. Had he been sincere with himself, he would have realized that such a response is blatant falsehood and that it is impermissible to dismiss the Sunnah of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ on such a pretext.”