creed; indeed, some contemporary Islamic preachers have gone so far as to declare that deriving doctrine from it is impermissible—actually prohibited.

Second: A number of maxims adopted by certain well-known legal schools in their works of legal theory (uṣūl). The ones that presently come to mind are:

a) Giving precedence to analogy (qiyās) over a solitary report ⦗al-Iʿlām 1/327, 300; Sharḥ al-Manār, p. 623⦘.

b) Rejecting a solitary report whenever it conflicts with the established principles (uṣūl) ⦗al-Iʿlām 1/329; Sharḥ al-Manār, p. 646⦘.

c) Dismissing any ḥadith that lays down a ruling additional to the Qur’an on the claim that this would constitute abrogation, and that the Sunnah cannot abrogate the Qur’an ⦗Sharḥ al-Manār, p. 647; al-Aḥkām 2/66⦘.

d) Preferring what is general over what is specific when the two seem to conflict, or ruling that the general wording of the Qur’an may not be qualified by a solitary report ⦗Sharḥ al-Manār, pp. 289–294; Irshād al-Fuhūl, pp. 138–139, 143–144⦘.

e) Giving precedence to the practice of the people of Medina over an authentic ḥadith.

Third: Blind imitation (taqlīd) and adopting it as one’s school and religion.