As for the first category—the religious—one cannot know the means that lead to it except through a Sharia-based proof. Thus, were someone to claim that his tawassul to Allah through one of His majestic cosmic signs, such as the night or the day, guarantees an answer to supplication, his claim would be rejected unless he could provide evidence. In that case it is impossible to say that this tawassul is merely permissible, for the assertion negates itself: you are calling it a “means,” yet the Sacred Law offers no proof for it, nor is there any other way to establish it.

This stands in contrast to the second category—worldly aims—whose causes may be recognized through reason, knowledge, experience, and the like. A man who trades in wine, for instance, employs a well-known way to obtain money, a means to the intended goal of wealth. Nevertheless, Allah has forbidden that means, so it is impermissible to pursue it. By contrast, trading in something Allah has not prohibited is lawful. But any supposed cause that is said to draw one closer to Allah and to make one’s supplication more likely to be accepted can be known only through revelation. Once it is affirmed that the Sharia has not endorsed such a cause, it cannot be called a “means,” much less declared a permissible form of tawassul. A detailed treatment of this point has already appeared in Chapter Two of this treatise.

A second consideration is that the tawassul whose lack of textual basis we have conceded is rendered superfluous by other forms that the Sharia does sanction—namely, the three types mentioned at the outset of our discussion. What, then, would lead a Muslim to adopt a form of tawassul that has no basis while turning away from the forms that do? The scholars agree unanimously that whenever an innovation conflicts with a Sunnah, it is—by consensus—a misguided innovation. This tawassul falls squarely into that category; therefore it is not permissible to practice it, even on the pretext of mere permissibility, let alone as something recommended.