the end it serves is likewise obligatory. I therefore ask: why should the same reasoning not be applied to the command to hasten, as we have explained? It seems the author—may Allah have mercy on him—became aware of this point in his work Al-Rawdah, for he raised an objection against himself that hints at it, saying (p. 137): “If it is said, ‘Since hastening to it is obligatory, then it is even more certain that it itself is obligatory,’ the answer is: the hastening is not solely for the khutba but for both it and the prayer, and the main purpose for which the hastening has been imposed is the prayer; therefore the a fortiori inference does not hold.” I reply: although this contradicts the view he adopted at the beginning of the discussion, namely that the khutba is what is meant by ‘the remembrance of Allah’, it does not deny that the khutba is still included under that term, albeit to a lesser degree than the prayer. Consequently, the command to hasten to the remembrance continues to embrace the khutba; and if that is the case, the statement that once hastening to it is obligatory then it is even more clearly obligatory remains valid, and the reply he offered, Allah willing, is weakened. Moreover, there is another method of establishing the obligation of the khutba: to bear in mind that the deed of the Prophet ﷺ—especially one he maintained consistently—when performed as an exposition of a Qurʾanic or prophetic command, is evidence that the deed itself is obligatory. This type of argument is well-established in usul al-fiqh and recognised by leading scholars, the author himself among them—may Allah have mercy on him—for he used this very proof to demonstrate the obligation of another issue concerning certain qualities of the khutba, not