established merely because a man says, “I know nothing but good of him,” or, “He is upright both for me and against me.” Rather, he must state, “He is upright and acceptable.” He may not be satisfied with calling him “upright” without also saying he is “acceptable,” nor with calling him “acceptable” without also affirming that he is “upright,” until he combines the two descriptions. This is the distilled position of Mālik’s school according to the great majority of his followers. A second report from Mālik, however, holds that either one of the two descriptions suffices for certification, and that is the sound view.
If a man is already known for piety and learning, famous for it, and no blemish has appeared in him, the judge may dispense with formal attestation, refrain from inquiring about him, and simply accept him.
When two men vouch for someone while two others impeach him, the judge follows the impeachment; for if the two sides are equal in uprightness and the alleged defect is something that may be hidden, testimony establishing the defect takes precedence. The judge must ask the impeachers to clarify the nature of the defect. Mālik said that the judge should say to them, “On what grounds do you impeach him?” so that he may examine the matter, for what they regard as a defect may not be one in his estimation. He must also require them to state when they learned of it, for it may be something long past and the man may have since reformed.
No one may impeach a witness unless the critic is himself manifestly upright and of superior virtue. The criticism of an equal or inferior is not accepted—unless he testifies that the witness is hostile to the litigant, in which case the impeachment of an equal or even an inferior is admissible. If a person enjoys wide renown for integrity and merit, the judge will not permit anyone to discredit him except on grounds of hostility—unless the man himself commits something that would bar the acceptance of his testimony even from someone of comparable standing.
If the judge consults a man whose probity he trusts about someone and that man declares him upright, the judge may accept his single statement and act upon it—provided it is not being offered as formal testimony, for in that case two upright witnesses are required—and there is no objection.