possess legitimate parentage—that is, if he was born out of wedlock—his testimony is rejected. A child born in lawful wedlock whose father is known may testify in every matter except fornication; in cases of fornication Mālik considers him suspect and therefore does not admit his testimony.
Anyone who memorised a testimony while still a non-Muslim or a slave and then delivers it after embracing Islam and gaining his freedom has his testimony accepted—unless he had already offered the same testimony, it was rejected, and he now tries to present it again. In that situation Mālik and the scholars of Madinah rule it inadmissible. This opinion is transmitted from ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān (d. 35 AH), and none of the Companions differed with him. They likewise agree that if a man’s testimony was first rejected because of open sin and he later reforms, that particular testimony is never accepted thereafter.
A man may testify to something he observed and retained in childhood once he attains puberty.
As for the statement “the testimony of a litigant is invalid,” an example would be two men who appear in court claiming that a certain man appointed them as his agents to contract a marriage for him, while he denies it. Their testimony against him is inadmissible because they are his actual opponents in the suit.
Whoever habitually plays chess or backgammon and becomes known for it has his testimony disqualified. Some scholars hold that merely being known for playing backgammon—even without habitual involvement—bars a man’s testimony, citing an explicit hadith on the matter.
If it is proven that a person was so engrossed in chess that he missed a single prayer until its time had passed—such as either of the daytime prayers until sunset, either of the night prayers until dawn, or the dawn prayer until sunrise—his testimony is not accepted until he repents. This is the purport of what Ibn Nāfiʿ related from Mālik.
Whoever neglects the Friday prayer three consecutive times without a valid excuse forfeits his eligibility to testify. Some maintain that a single deliberate absence suffices to invalidate testimony, but the first view is stronger.