—property in his possession that it is qirāḍ (silent-partnership) capital, while its owner insists that it is only a deposit, the statement of the confessing party prevails, for had he not admitted anything he would have been liable for no more than an oath.

A second opinion, also related from Mālik and his companions, is that the owner’s word is accepted: it is a deposit.

A third view they give is this: if it is known that the confessing party has already put the money to use—handling it, buying with it and entering into trade—then the owner’s claim must be upheld, because a deposit may not be used. If, however, he has not moved the money, the confessing party’s word stands.

If one of the heirs acknowledges that a slave included in the estate was set free by the deceased, while the other heirs refuse to believe him, they must sell the slave. When the acknowledger receives his share of the price, he must purchase another slave and emancipate him; if the amount is insufficient for an entire slave, he frees half a slave, and if even that cannot be done, he applies the sum toward the final instalments of a mukātib (a slave buying his freedom).

Should the estate contain several slaves, and some of the heirs testify that the deceased emancipated one of them by name, that slave is not required to swear together with the heirs; he gains his freedom, for emancipation is not established by an oath and one witness—two witnesses are indispensable. If the slaves are later divided and the slave in question falls into the share of the heir who acknowledged his manumission, he is thereby set free.

Whoever admits owing a man ten light (deficient) dinars, while the claimant maintains that they are full-weight, the statement of the confessing party is accepted, subject to his oath.

If a man acknowledges to his wife a debt—whether a loan or her dower—and then says, “I have paid you,” his word is not accepted without proof. This differs from cases in which he sells, buys, or receives payment on her behalf, for in those matters she has appointed him as her agent, and her only recourse is his oath.

If, while dying, a man says, “So-and-so has ten dinars with me, and he owes me five,” but the person to whom the ten are acknowledged denies the five, judgment is entered in his favour for the ten, while the heirs must furnish evidence for the five. This contrasts with the case of a man who bequeaths ten dinars of his estate to someone and says to me—