is annulled.

If, during his terminal illness, a man acknowledges that he still owes his wife her bridal gift (mahr), that acknowledgment does not benefit her when she will inherit from him collaterally (kalālah) or when he is clearly infatuated with her—unless it becomes manifest that he has cut ties with her or inclined toward another woman and no suspicion attaches to her. In such a case his acknowledgment in her favor is allowed. Whenever the deceased leaves a child—whether by that wife or by any other—his acknowledgment in her favor, whether for the mahr or for something else, is effective, for the presence of a child dispels any suspicion of tawlīj in her favor.

Likewise, if a terminally ill woman declares that she has received her mahr from her husband, her declaration is not accepted, for she is suspected of intending it as a bequest to him. If, however, that suspicion is removed—because she has children by him or by someone else—her acknowledgment is valid.

When a person who will be succeeded only by collateral heirs (kalālah) acknowledges a debt to a flattering friend, the acknowledgment is invalid—neither against the entirety of the estate nor even against one-third of it. Another report from Malik allows it up to one third, treating it like a bequest. If, however, his sons are his heirs, the acknowledgment is enforceable in every case.

Where a person acknowledges a right to someone else—whether what is claimed is bound up with the acknowledgment or separate from it—the authorities differ widely. If he admits holding a deposit for another and then claims that he has returned it, his word is accepted. If he admits a deferred debt, his statement about the term is accepted unless he names a term that is manifestly unreasonable. A second view holds that, if the creditor insists the debt is immediately due and swears an oath, his word prevails; yet the first view is more correct, for the debtor could simply have kept silent and never confessed. Malik sees no difference between a debtor’s saying, “You gave it to me,” and his saying, “I took it from you.”

If someone confesses to stealing property whose theft entails amputation of the hand, asserting that it belonged to a particular owner, and that owner denies possession, Malik still obliges the thief to pay the item’s value and orders the legal amputation for the theft. The owner may, if he wishes, reclaim the stolen article or leave it.

If he acknowledges that he holds another’s money as partnership capital (qirāḍ) or as a deposit and then says, “It has been destroyed,” while the owner responds, “Rather, it was a loan and therefore remains your liability,” the owner’s claim is upheld. Such is the substance of the madhhab.