Mālik expressed two different views as to whose responsibility the warranty is when the sale is rescinded by iqāla (mutual cancellation). On one occasion he said that the warranty lies with the buyer and that the rescission is invalid; on another he stated that the party performing the cancellation has a choice: if he wishes, he records the warranty against the seller, and if he wishes, against the purchaser.

Whatever the buyer has built, planted, or otherwise improved, the pre-emptor must reimburse him for the whole cost, deducting it from the purchase-price, should he wish to exercise his right of pre-emption.

If someone buys a plot of land and sows it, and the pre-emptor then appears, the latter must pay the sale-price, while the buyer is entitled to an amount equivalent to the land’s rent in relation to the crop; he has no claim to any part of the crop itself. This ruling applies only when the pre-emptor demands his right during a season in which he himself could have sown the land had he wished. If the planting season has already passed, the buyer is not entitled to rent, and the pre-emptor is still obligated to pay the price.

When a person claims pre-emption in a share, alleging that his partner has sold it, and the seller admits to the sale while the buyer denies it, no proof of purchase being produced, and the buyer swears that he did not buy, the claimant is not granted pre-emption on the basis of the seller’s admission alone.

Likewise, if the buyer confesses that he has purchased a share over which pre-emption is due, and the pre-emptor demands it while the seller is absent and the buyer can produce no evidence of the sale, the judge does not compel the buyer to hand the share over to the pre-emptor merely on account of his own admission. Should the owner of the house later arrive and deny that any sale took place, he is entitled to rent. If, however, the judge rules for the pre-emptor against the buyer and the pre-emptor then resides in the house, he owes no rent, for his occupancy is regarded as doubtful possession.

The right of pre-emption is operative with respect to the estate of the deceased just as it is with respect to the property of the living.

Pre-emption is taken for the purchase-price, not for the market value. Therefore, when the sale is concluded by exchanging merchandise, that merchandise is appraised because it functions as the price, whereas the share itself is not appraised—except in the case of a marriage contract. When a share is given as the marriage consideration, the share is valued, for dealings in marriage are usually acts of generosity rather than commercial bargaining, and this makes an appraisal of the share necessary.

His statement that “pre-emption belongs to partners in proportion to their respective shares” is to be understood in this way.