with someone comparable to him in lightness and general condition.
If a man hires transport for the pilgrimage and the lessor delays until the time has passed, the lease is annulled outright. By contrast, if he hires it for any purpose other than Hajj, stipulates a particular date, and the lessor still defaults, the contract is not dissolved, nor is the obligation to carry the agreed load—or its equivalent—dropped. Some nevertheless hold that it is void; the first view is the established position of the school, while the second is preferable in my eyes whenever the missed time is like a season that cannot be recovered.
One who has rented out a beast or camel for a specified destination may not break off the journey before arrival and claim payment in proportion to the distance travelled and the load already carried, nor may the lessee simply change his mind midway. Each party is bound to fulfil what he undertook, unless they both consent to settle for what has actually been done.
There is no objection to hiring a mount to a known town for a particular errand while stipulating that, should the need be met en route, he will turn back from the spot where it is met and pay accordingly. Mālik deems this valid so long as the fare has not been handed over; other jurists allow it whether or not payment has been made in advance.
Anything that may lawfully be given as the hire-price of a beast may likewise be used to charter a ship—gold, silver, a specified amount of food, and the like. It is also permissible to charter a vessel from one town to another for a portion of the very food it is transporting, provided the shipowner takes that portion on the spot and does not stipulate deferring receipt until the port of delivery. If he does stipulate such deferment, the contract is invalid, for it concerns specific food that he obliges himself to receive in another town, which is impermissible. If no stipulation is made and both remain silent on the point, the charter is valid, for the owner has not been prevented from taking his share—this is Mālik’s position. Ibn al-Qāsim held that unless the shipowner explicitly conditions taking his share the contract is void, yet Mālik’s opinion is the one to be followed.
Finally, according to both Mālik and Ibn al-Qāsim, a ship is chartered on a delivery basis: the owner is entitled to no payment until it reaches the agreed destination.