If he voluntarily gives her authority without any stipulation and not at the moment the marriage contract is concluded—this is mentioned by Ibn Wahb in his recension of the Muwaṭṭaʾ—and Ismāʿīl transmitted from Abū Thābit, from Ibn Wahb, that Mālik said of a man who, at the very time of contracting the marriage, binds himself with the condition, “If I should marry another wife, acquire a concubine, or cause you harm, your affair is in your own hand,” and then he actually does so and she pronounces an irrevocable divorce upon herself, whereupon he protests, “I empowered you for only one pronouncement”—Mālik ruled that her word is to be accepted and he no longer has any claim over her until she has married another husband.
Mālik further said: If, while she is already in his household, he grants her that authority freely and without any prior stipulation, then his statement is accepted; he must swear that he meant no more than a single pronouncement.
He added, “This case is not comparable to the stipulations attached at the very outset of the marriage.” I asked, “What distinguishes the two?” He replied, “In the first, he conferred the authority as a voluntary gift, whereas in the second it was imposed upon him as a contractual condition. If he still retained the right to take her back, her condition would be of no benefit to her.”
Therefore, whenever he grants her authority voluntarily and without condition, his statement is accepted, he must swear to it, and the resulting divorce is revocable. The same does not apply to what is stipulated at the root of the marriage and at the time the contract is made.
Ibn ʿAbd al-Ḥakam likewise reported from Mālik: If a man empowers his wife and makes it a condition in the marriage contract that, should he marry another woman, control of her own affair returns to her, and he then does marry someone else and she divorces herself, and he afterwards claims, “I intended only one pronouncement,” his claim is of no avail to him; she has already become irrevocably separated from him. Intention is considered only when he granted her authority voluntarily and without condition.
Accordingly, if at the very moment of contracting the marriage he places her affair in her own hand contingent upon his taking another wife, and he later does so and she pronounces a triple divorce upon herself, he has no right to dispute her according to Mālik. Conversely, if he empowers her voluntarily and without condition, Mālik holds that he may indeed challenge her action.