and the husband may then seek to recover the dower from her guardian—her father or her brother—for it is scarcely conceivable that either of them was unaware of the defect. If the guardian was instead a paternal cousin, a client, or another clansman who had no knowledge of it, he bears no liability.
The woman herself must return the entire dower because she was the one who concealed the defect, though she is allowed to keep the token amount that renders intercourse lawful—according to Mālik, one-quarter of a dinar or three dirhams. The husband must swear that, after discovering the defect, he took no pleasure from her; if he nevertheless had intercourse with her after learning of it, the marriage stands and he no longer has the right to annul it.
When the guardian repays the dower he may not recoup it from the woman, and the husband, once he has reclaimed the dower from the guardian, may not waive any part of it. The brothers and paternal cousins must swear that they were unaware of the defect; if they do so, the woman returns the dower minus one-quarter of a dinar.
Should any of these defects befall the woman after the contract but before consummation, the husband is given a choice: he may proceed with the marriage and pay the full dower, or separate and pay only half. If one of the four defects is found in the man and the woman dislikes him on that account, she may leave him. Mālik, however, voiced two opinions on vitiligo in the man: at one time he ruled that it is treated the same as in the woman and justifies annulment; at another, that the man’s case differs.
If she elects to part from him before intercourse, she receives nothing—except when the defect is impotence, for in that he deceived her. If he subsequently cohabits with her, she becomes entitled to her dower, yet her having allowed intercourse does not constitute permanent acquiescence. When impotence is discovered after the contract, the man is granted one year to seek treatment; should he recover, the marriage remains, otherwise they are separated. The same applies to leprosy: if no cure is hoped for, separation is decreed immediately upon her request. If the leprosy is widespread and emits an offensive odor that causes evident harm, they are separated at once unless she consents to stay with him. Vitiligo, however, is not treated in this way.
Nor may a woman be rejected for blindness, for a dark complexion, for the loss of one eye, or because she is not—