then she is entitled to the full dower; Mālik’s ruling on this point is undisputed.

If, during that year or at any time thereafter, the husband claims under oath that he did have intercourse with her, his word is accepted. In this regard Mālik makes no distinction between a virgin bride and one who has been previously married.

A judicial separation on account of impotence counts as a single irrevocable divorce. Should he later remarry her, she is deemed to have two divorces against him, and in this second marriage she retains the option either to remain with him or to leave. This differs from the case of a castrated husband, for impotence may be cured whereas castration is permanent.

As for a eunuch or a castrated man, if either consummates the marriage and subsequently divorces his wife, he must pay the full dower whether her waiting period is long or short; the impotent husband is treated differently.

If the impotent man is a slave, Mālik grants him only half the grace period allowed to a free man. The majority of jurists, however, make no distinction between free men and slaves in this matter, and that view too is reported from Mālik.

When a man becomes impotent only after he has already had intercourse with his wife, she is never given the right to annul the marriage or to bring a case against him. The same applies when a man grows old and becomes incapable of intercourse: no separation is effected between him and his wife.