consummation, or after he has been summoned to consummate yet finds nothing from which to maintain her, and she wishes a separation between them, then—if she makes that request—the judge postpones the matter for whatever period he deems appropriate. That postponement should ordinarily be no more than three days or a week; some have said thirty days, others two months. In fact, setting a fixed limit is an error: the issue is left to the judge’s ijtihād in view of the woman’s need and her capacity for patience—for hunger admits of no patience.

The separation constitutes a single revocable divorce. If he becomes solvent during her waiting period, he may take her back, provided he had already consummated the marriage. He is not liable for maintenance for the period of his insolvency, and the revocation is not valid unless he is now solvent.

It is reported from Mālik that if he regains solvency during the waiting period, he may revoke the divorce whether or not he had consummated with her. I do not understand this, for in the case of one with whom he has not consummated the divorce is already revocable.

The amount of maintenance is set in proportion to the husband’s financial circumstances, whether in hardship or in ease, according to what is customarily recognized as suitable for someone of his standing and for someone of hers.