speak only of regulating the order of guardians according to who is more virtuous and more fitting; this is recommended, not obligatory. Such is the distilled doctrine of Mālik as reported by most of his pupils, and it is the view adopted by Ismāʿīl ibn Isḥāq and those who follow him.

A second opinion holds that the ruler should look into the matter: he asks the nearest guardian about the grounds of his objection; if the ruler finds it persuasive he upholds it, and if not he sets it aside.

Others maintain that, in every case, the nearest guardian himself may ratify or annul the marriage, for that prerogative belongs to him. A third view gives him that right only so long as the marriage has not been allowed to drag on and the woman has not yet borne children. All of these are opinions transmitted from the scholars of Medina.

If the nearest guardian is insane or feeble-minded, the next guardian in line marries her off, and the former is treated as though he were deceased. The same ruling applies when the closest guardian is away on a long journey or his speedy return is not expected: either the next guardian in order or the judge contracts the marriage. Another view says that when the nearest guardian is absent the one after him may not marry her; instead, the judge must do so. The first position is that of Mālik.

When two guardians are equal in degree and one of them is absent, and the woman authorises the guardian who is present to conclude her marriage, the absentee has no right to object when he returns. If both are present and she entrusts the affair to one of them, he may not act without the permission of the other; and should they dispute, the judge examines the case and obliges her to accept whichever opinion he deems more beneficial for her. This was related by Ibn Wahb from Mālik.

Bequeathing the authority to arrange a marriage is valid just as the bequest of property is valid. In Mālik’s view the executor (waṣī) has priority over the guardian in contracting the marriage, though it is recommended that he consult the guardian; if the guardian marries her with the executor’s permission, that is praiseworthy. Another report from Mālik states that, in the case of a previously-married woman, the executor counts as one of the guardians and is therefore on the same footing with them; but the first opinion is the established teaching of his school.

Scholars other than Mālik assign no role to the executor in marriage: in their view he is not a guardian. They say, “Authority over the woman’s person belongs to the guardians, and authority over her property belongs to the executors.” And it is permissible