have with it a driver, a rider, or a leader—or if they are present but it becomes clear that the harm issued from the animal itself and not because of them—is jabār (waived); none of them bears any liability for it. The only exception is when the livestock destroy cultivated crops or a vineyard at night, in which case the ruling is the one already set forth in the separate chapter devoted to that matter.

An injury caused by a nursing infant, or by someone who lacks any capacity for discernment or intent, entails no diya, no retaliation, and no liability upon anyone; it is jabār, completely waived, exactly like the injury caused by a dumb beast.

If, however, the child does possess discernment and intentionality, so that such acts can validly proceed from him and he understands them, then every injury he commits is treated as unintentional: if it concerns property the compensation is paid from his own wealth, and if it concerns blood it is borne by his ʿāqila; his deliberate and accidental acts are treated alike.

When two horsemen collide, the ʿāqila of each must pay the full diya of the other, and each of them must, from his own property, pay the full value of the other’s horse. The same rule applies to two boats that collide, and likewise to anything struck when a rider’s horse collides with it.

If the owner of the horse was able to restrain it, or the owner of the boat was able to steer it clear, but they failed to do so, then they are personally liable out of their own wealth for both blood and property; in this situation intentional and unintentional are treated the same.

Whoever injures himself, whether intentionally or accidentally, incurs no liability upon his heirs, and nothing upon his ʿāqila. Similarly, if a woman drinks a potion and thereby aborts her fetus, she is not responsible for the ghurra.

And if a slain person is found between two tribes and it is not known who killed him, he is not