also that all of them must swear—even if the number of oaths exceeds fifty—and thereby they obtain the right to the victim’s blood. If they desire retaliation, they may carry it out; if they prefer to pardon, that is their prerogative; and if they settle with the killer for a sum, the agreed amount becomes part of their joint inheritance.

A perpetrator of deliberate homicide is lashed one hundred times and imprisoned for a year. In such cases only one person may be executed on the basis of qasāmah, no matter how many defendants are named. The others each receive one hundred lashes and are jailed for a full year.

If the heirs who claim the blood refuse to take the oaths—whether all of them or only some—the reports from Mālik differ. One transmission states that those who remain may swear and receive their respective shares of the diyah. Another says that if even one heir refuses, it is as though they all refused: the oaths then pass to the defendants, and neither the group nor any single heir retains any right to the blood money.

The soundest position from Mālik is the one recorded in his al-Muwaṭṭaʾ: whenever even a single heir who could lawfully pardon declines to swear, the path to blood-retaliation is closed, and the oaths revert to the defendant. If the defendant then swears fifty oaths, the claim is dismissed; if he refuses, he is detained until he swears.

Should none of the heirs abstain and they all swear, so that retaliation becomes due to them, but some of them later pardon, the word of those who choose to pardon prevails. Capital punishment is then barred, and those who did not pardon are entitled to their portions of the diyah.

This ruling concerns heirs who are sons, grandsons, brothers, or nephews. If instead they are paternal uncles or cousins and one of them refuses the oaths of qasāmah, Mālik and his associates hold two opinions: according to the first, those who remain may swear and execute one of the defendants; according to the second