deliberately and, as a result, the victim loses both eyes, or the wound turns into a munqilla (a displaced fracture), or he severs a finger and the whole hand later becomes paralysed, then retaliation is taken for the injury he actually inflicted, while the arsh (the monetary indemnity) is due for the harm that subsequently spread.

In Mālik’s view, retaliation and blood-money may come together in a single limb and from one and the same blow.

There is no retaliation for wounds when the offender is a Muslim and the victim a non-Muslim, nor when the offender is free and the victim a slave; there is no reciprocal retaliation between them in such cases. Were we to take the hand of a disbeliever for the hand of a Muslim, or the hand of a slave for that of a free man, it would be like exchanging a defective hand for a sound one.

Nor is a sound hand taken for a paralysed one, or an eye that still sits in its socket but is blind for an eye that sees. If the defect is slight—such as weak eyesight, or a hand that lacks no more than a fingertip or a single finger—retaliation is permissible between them.

For intentional wounds in which retaliation is not allowed, the diya is payable out of the aggressor’s property. Although different reports exist from Mālik on this point, this is the sound opinion and the one I adopt.

If a man cuts off another’s right hand while he himself has no right hand, his left hand is not taken in retaliation; instead he must pay its full diya. Likewise, if a man who is blind in his right eye destroys the right eye of someone whose sight is intact, his remaining left eye is not taken; he must pay the indemnity for the eye. Whether the two parties agree or object is irrelevant—each of them is compelled to abide by this ruling.

If a person whose hand is due to be cut in retaliation is attacked by another aggressor who deliberately severs that same hand, the hand of the aggressor now belongs to the one whose hand was cut: he may have it cut off if he wishes or settle for compensation. This holds when the second cutting was intentional, like the first. If the second cutting occurred by mistake, the man whose hand had originally been liable to be cut is entitled only to the diya, and he may not refuse it, for he had already incurred that very liability.

When a man’s right hand is to be cut off in retaliation but his left hand is severed in an unrelated incident, the retaliation is not cancelled; his right hand is still cut off for the right hand he took. However, if his right hand has already been amputated as the ḥadd for theft, the person whose right hand he severed has no claim to retaliation, for the penalty for theft takes precedence.

And if someone