—it then reverts to the grantor if he is still alive; if not, to his heirs, because the title to the corpus has remained in his ownership and is inherited from him. In effect, it is as though a condition were attached, allowing the beneficiary to make use of the property only for his own lifetime or that of his children. It makes no difference whether the grantor phrases the grant as “for your life,” “for your lifetime,” or names a specific number of years. In their view, an ʿumrā belongs to the same category as a gift of a she-camel’s or ewe’s milk: a mere favor. We have already set out their evidence and the purport of their position in al-Tamhīd.

An ʿumrā is valid with respect to every form of real estate, as well as slaves and all kinds of livestock. The life-tenant may neither sell what has been granted to him nor remove it from the owner’s estate until it returns to that owner under the stipulated condition—whether at the death of the beneficiary, the death of his child, or the expiry of the named years. Should the beneficiary die before the term ends, his heirs stand in his place.

The validity of an ʿumrā requires physical possession. If the grantor dies before the beneficiary has taken possession, the grant lapses—unless, while on his death-bed, the grantor instructs, “Let it stand for him.” In that case the ʿumrā is treated as a bequest falling within the one-third of the estate and is prorated with the other legacies.

Mālik allows the freeholder to compensate the beneficiary for his right of residence and to take back his house, whether the term was a fixed number of years or an unspecified lifetime, for the arrangement is treated as an act of kindness, not as a sale. In their view it matters little whether the usufruct in question is dwelling in a house, the service of a slave, riding an animal, or milk from a donated animal; the grantor may buy back that usufruct for whatever price he wishes—gold, silver, or any other goods, consumable or not, in cash or on credit, as he sees fit.

Likewise, a person who has received an ʿumrā, a right of residence, or a milk grant may lawfully sell whatever right he holds to another who will take his place, just as sales are ordinarily permitted. As for raqbā, Mālik attaches no legal weight to it; his associates treat it as a mere loaned object.

If someone allows another to live in a dwelling until a fixed date and the resident dies before that date, the right passes to his heirs until the term is completed. This, however, is not comparable to maintenance that a person bequeaths to another for a specified period.