—whether they are remote relatives or any other avenue to which he directed the reversion.

One illustration is as follows: during his terminal illness a man may endow a ḥabs upon his children and grandchildren, charging it to one-third of his estate while omitting his wife and his parents. The ḥabs is then divided among the number of children and grandchildren; whatever portion falls to the direct children is shared with the parents and the wife, who apportion it among themselves according to the shares ordained by God.

If one of the direct children dies, his portion is redistributed among the surviving direct children and the grandchildren. The part that thereby comes to the direct children is again shared with the parents and the wife—or with their heirs should they themselves have died—in the proportions set by the Law.

Should the parents, either of them, or the wife die, the share of whoever has died passes to his or her heirs so long as any of the direct children remain alive. Once the direct children have all passed away, the entire ḥabs devolves to the grandchildren and every claim of the parents, the wife, and their heirs ceases.

If someone endows a sword, an animal, a garment, or a slave upon two men for the whole of their lives, and after their deaths assigns it to another cause, then when one of the two men dies his share reverts to the other; when the second man dies, it passes to the cause named for after them. Some hold that the first man’s share returns to the other even in this case. Yet, if the endowed object is divisible and yields income or produce, and one of the two men dies, his share does not revert to his companion but rather goes to the subsequent cause.

If he endows a dwelling upon the two of them, the ruling depends on the purpose: if he endowed it for them merely to reside in, the ruling is the same as for the slave, the animal, and the sword; but if he endowed it so that they might rent it out, the ruling follows what we have stated concerning items that can be divided and apportioned.

The donor’s stipulation regarding whatever he has endowed is binding—for instance, that it be for the male offspring rather than the female, or for the female rather than the male, or for some of them to the exclusion of others, or on the condition that